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"STACKING" UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION,
MEDICAL PAYMENTS, AND PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
COVERAGES IN TEXAS
EDWARD J. YORK, JR.
A considerable amount of litigation has arisen over the past few years concerning the "stacking" of insurance coverages.' Stacking refers to aggregating coverage limits between policies or among provisions within a single pol-

icy. 2 The issue as to whether uninsured motorist protection and medical payments clauses in standard automobile liability policies should be stacked has
been settled by the Texas courts. 3 Generally, stacking is permitted for medi4
cal payments coverage while it is denied for uninsured motorist coverage.
The cases, however, present some difficulty in determining the real basis for
their decisions and are therefore subject to some criticism.
The stacking of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits," on the other
1. See generally Comment, Pyramiding of Insurance Coverage Under the Standard
Family Automobile Liability Policy, 14 VILL. L. REv. 279 (1969).
2. See Blocker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 332 A.2d 476, 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975);
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Tex. 1974).
For example, A is involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist while riding
in B's car. A has a single insurance policy covering his two automobiles and B has
an insurance policy covering the car involved in the accident. Both policies contain uninsured motorist protection clauses. If both A and B's insurance policies provide protection to A then the payments made are said to be stacked since he is receiving multiple
benefits from one accident up to the amount of his actual damages. A may also attempt
to recover the amount of two uninsured motorist limits under his own policy for the
reason that he has two cars insured and has paid separate premiums for each. In American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793, 796-97 (Tex. 1972), a case with facts
identical to the example, stacking was permitted between the different policies, but was
not permitted as to coverages in the insured's policy.
3. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974) (denying
stacking of uninsured motorist provisions); Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346
S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ) (allowing medical payments
stacking). Uninsured motorist clauses are designed to protect an insured person who
is injured by a motorist who is uninsured, or is a hit-and-run driver. TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Supp. 1975); 12 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:619,
at 566-67 (2d ed. 1964). Medical payments clauses are extensions of accident and automobile liability coverages but without regard to fault on the part of the insured. See
13 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw 48:71, at 563, and § 48:73, at 56465 (2d ed. 1965).
4. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974); Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1961, no writ).
5. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Supp. 1975).

cussed more extensively later in the article.

The PIP provisions are dis-

Basically, PIP protection is the same as
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hand, has never been considered by a Texas appellate court. PIP is analogous to uninsured motorist clauses in that it is a statutorily required provision
in all insurance policies, and is subject to the same policy exceptions and exclusions as are uninsured motorist provisions in most policies., It is also comparable to medical payments clauses, in a generic sense, in that the same type

of benefits are provided without regard to fault on the part of the insured.
This comment will review the Texas law concerning stacking of uninsured
motorist protection and medical payments provisions within a single multicar policy, particularly with a view towards predicting whether personal injury protection stacking will be permitted.
STACKING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGES

In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 7 the Texas Supreme Court
disallowed stacking of uninsured motorist provisions in a single multi-car policy, thus resolving earlier conflicting decisions. 8 Westchester was a combined
opinion involving two conflicting decisions from different courts of civil appeals. In Westchester an automobile policy was issued to the insured covering his two vehicles. The policy contained the standard uninsured motorist
clauses in the stated bodily injury limits of $10,000 for each person and
$20,000 for each accident. An uninsured motorist negligently collided with
one of the insured's vehicles causing stipulated damages of $15,000. In another case, Dhane v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,9 the facts were subthat provided by medical payments clauses providing payment for medical expenses and
loss of earnings.
6. The wording of the provisions in most automobile liability policies is usually
very much the same. For convenience, throughout the text, references to uninsured
motorist clauses and medical payments clauses will refer to the provisions as given in
the appellate decision in which they appear. Due to the recent development of personal
injury protection coverage, no standard policy provisions, that is model policies, are
available in any source material. See 95 CCH AUTO. L. REP.
2460. The lack of
any textual reference, plus the absence of cases on personal injury protection have resulted in the use of provisions from the Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement, Form
241 (1973).
7. 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
8. Stacking had been previously prohibited. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau,
481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972), noted in 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 444 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Zellars, 462 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. 1970). Contra, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Turner, 498 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), rev'd per
curiam, 512 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. 1974) (stacking allowed); Westchester Fire Ins. Co.
,. Tucker, 494 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), rev'd,
512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974) (stacking allowed). The cases leading up to Westchester have been examined at length in other comments and will not be reviewed here.
See generally Comment, A Collation of Recent Texas Cases on Stacking and Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 11 Hous. L. REV. 466 (1974); Comment, Pyramiding of Uninsured
Motorist Protection: The Confusion Inherent in Overgeneralization, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
568 (1973).
9. 497 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), aff'd sub nor. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
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stantially the same except that the policy covered three automobiles. The
insured plaintiffs in both cases contended that since they had paid separate
premiums for each of the automobiles in their respective policies, they should
be entitled to recover the policy limits for each automobile separately at least
up to the total amount of their damages. The insurance companies maintained that the extra premium was merely consideration for uninsured motorist coverage on each added automobile, and therefore, the coverages should
not be stacked.
The Houston Court of Civil Appeals in Westchester agreed with the plaintiffs and allowed the policy limits for each automobile to be stacked, reasoning that the plaintiff had paid for uninsured motorist coverage on both cars
through two separate premiums, therefore, consideration had been given for
two separate uninsured motorist coverages.'
In Dhane, the Waco Court of
Civil Appeals took a contrary view. It noted that no ambiguity existed in
a policy clause which excluded uninsured coverage on vehicles owned by the
insured but for which he had not paid a specific premium.' 1 In other words,
although a premium paid on automobile number one covers the insured regardless of which car he is riding in, or even if he does not occupy an automobile, the above exclusion operates to deny coverage where the insured is
riding in vehicle number two or three if he owns them but has not paid a
premium to insure them. This reasoning supported the point of view of the
defendant-insurer that the extra premiums paid for subsequent automobiles
were to provide uninsured coverage only for the added vehicles. Again, using the above example, the extra premiums paid would provide coverage to
the insured while occupying the second and third vehicles where previously
no such coverage existed.
The supreme court upheld the latter point of view. 12 The court first noted
that the policies presented no ambiguities as to wording. 13 The separability
clause, for instance, stated that where there is more than one automobile insured, the terms of the policy apply separately to each. This clause specifically applied to the liability, medical payments, and physical damage portions of the policy and not to the uninsured motorist protection. 1 4 Further10. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 494 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), rev'd, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
11. Dhane v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1973), af'd sub nom. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.

1974).,
12. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).

13. Id. at 682. This lack of ambiguity is important since cases which allow stacking
of medical payment clauses are usually based upon ambiguities in the insurance contract
which are resolved against the insurer. See Greer v. Associated Indemn. Corp., 371
F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1967); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 686

(Tex. 1974); Harlow v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 365, 368
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ).

14. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1974).
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more, the wording in the uninsured motorist clause, which stated the insurer
would "pay all sums," could not possibly be construed to extend policy limits
to the amount of actual damages suffered by the insured.15
The court then observed that the uninsured motorist clause stipulated the
limit of liability under that provision to be the limit of the insurer's liability
for all damages sustained by one person in one accident. Combining this
clause with the $10,000/$20,000 upper limit found in the policy declarations, the total liability to any one person in any one accident was $10,000.16
With the total liability thus expressly stated, no stacking could be permitted
7
to increase that liability.'
The court rejected the Houston court's argument that the insured had paid
separate consideration for risk exposure on both automobiles. They reasoned that under a standard policy, uninsured motorist protection was provided for the named insured, including relatives living in the same household,
and any guest occupying an insured automobile. Therefore, a guest has no
coverage unless riding in an insured automobile.' 8 Moreover, the exclusions
section of the policy provided that coverage did not extend to an insured
while occupying an automobile owned by him but for which he had not paid
a premium. The result of both provisions was that the legal consideration
for including second and subsequent vehicles was the protection given to the
insured (including relatives) and guests while occupying the additional automobiles.' 9 The fact that there was adequate consideration given, in conjunction with the purpose of the clause limiting liability, supported the insurer's
contention that there should be no stacking.
The court also decided whether consideration had been given by the insurer for the second and third premiums. The court stated that the extra
premium covered the insured and relatives while occupying or being struck
by the additional insured vehicle, and guests while occupying the additional
15. Id. at 682-83.
16. Id. at 683.

17. In holding that the separability and limit of liability clauses were unambiguous

the supreme court avoided the necessity of using general rules of construction to construe a policy in favor of the insured. For a review of these rules see Kelley v. American Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958), af'd on other
grounds, 325 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1959). Courts have relied extensively on these rules
of construction to allow stacking of medical payment coverages. See, e.g., Lerman v.
Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 382 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ); cf. Westchester v. Rhoades, 405 S.W.2d 812, 816
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Willingham v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 288
S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no writ).
18. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
19. Id. at 684; accord, Bogart v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 473 F.2d 619, 621-24 (5th
Cir. 1973); see American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Tex.
1972).
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insured vehicle. 20 The extra premium, by implication, would be charged for
additional automobile usage. If the insurer charged an extra premium to a
single insured owning more than one automobile, there would still be adequate, or at least legal, consideration in having coverage extended to the sec21
ond and subsequent vehicles.
The rule against stacking uninsured motorist protection has been followed
in a majority of jurisdictions. The reasoning advanced by most courts, as
in Westchester, is that due to the increased risk in having two vehicles on
the highway, there is sufficient consideration and justification for charging a
separate premium for additional vehicles covered by the same policy. 22 There
is, however, contrary authority in other jurisdictions. In Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,2 3 the plaintiff's son, while a passenger in an automobile not owned by the insured, was killed in an accident with an uninsured
motorist. Both the plaintiff and the driver of the car in which the plaintiff's
son had been riding had automobile liability policies, each covering three
automobiles with uninsured coverages in the amount of $5,000/$10,000. The
plaintiff sought $15,000 from each of the two insurers on the basis that the
policy limits in each policy should be stacked. The Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision to stack damages. 24 The court's reasoning was based on the fact that the Louisiana uninsured motorist statute
required insurance "with respect to any motor vehicle; ' 25 therefore, a policy
which insured only the named vehicle violates the statute and is void by law.
The result is that whenever a policy is issued to an insured, all automobiles
are covered; where separate policies are issued, separate uninsured motorist
recoveries will be allowed; and where one policy covers multiple vehicles, and
separate premiums are paid for each, multiple recoveries should also be per26
mitted.
20. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
21. It could well be argued that a second premium would be grossly unfair since

a single insured with no relatives covered by the terms of the policy could drive only
one car at any one time. There would be no increased risk to the insurer in such cases
except where the insured allowed persons to borrow his automobiles, thus providing
them with coverage. Upon rehearing, the Westchester court considered and dismissed

the plaintiff's contention that premium rates were unfair under the holding of the case.
Id. at 686-87. Since it is the province of the State Board of Insurance to fix reasonable and adequate rates, the court refused to further examine the question.

22. See, e.g., Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ill. Ct. App. 1971);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. McHugh, 304 A.2d 777, 778 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973); Castle v.
United Pacific Ins. Group, 448 P.2d 357 (Ore. 1968).

23. 298 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
24. Id. at 919.
25. Id. at 918 (emphasis original).
26. Id. at 918-19. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to review this case on the
basis that there was "no error of law." Wilkinson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 302 So.
2d 306 (La. 1974).

In Blocker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 332 A.2d 476 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1975) the court allowed two recoveries under one policy on the basis that ambiguities in the insurance contract would be resolved against the insurer. The policy in that
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The Wilkinson case and other Louisiana opinions do not treat the consideration aspect relied upon in other jurisdictions; instead they employ the
novel rationale that the wording of the uninsured motorist statute requires
insurance policies to give protection with respect to any automobile. It is
interesting to note that similar wording is used in the Texas uninsured motorist statute; 27 however, this language has not influenced the Texas Supreme
Court to deviate from what it considers to be the better line of reasoning in
28
denying stacking.
The salient point raised by the Texas courts in cases concerning stacking
of uninsured motorist coverage is that valid consideration has been given by
each party to the insurance contract. Despite the interpretation given the
policies and statutes, when a vehicle is added to a policy, additional risk is
incurred by the insurer for which the insured should compensate. Where the
risk is virtually the same regardless of the number of automobiles the insured
may place on the highway, then no added consideration should be charged
for the additional vehicles, or in the alternative, where additional premiums
are charged, additional coverage should be given.
MEDICAL PAYMENTS AND RELATED CLAIMS

The consideration argument has been used by Texas courts, as well as
other jurisdictions, when construing insurance clauses providing for medical
payments made necessary as the result of an automobile accident. 29 In addition, conflicting policy provisions have allowed the courts to construe the insurance contracts in favor of the insured. The leading case in Texas is
Southwestern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Atkins, 30 where the plaintiff was issued
one policy which provided coverage on her two automobiles for personal injury, property damage liability, and medical payments. The plaintiff's
daughter was injured when struck by a third vehicle, and pursuant to the
medical payments clause of the policy the insurer tendered payment of
$500-the policy limit-even though medical expenses incurred as a result
of the accident were in excess of $1,000. Since premiums were charged separately for each car, the plaintiff sought recovery of an additional $500 from
the insurer.8 1
case, however, did not expressly exclude from uninsured motorist coverage other automobiles owned by the insured for which premiums had not been paid. Id. at 479.
27. TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Supp. 1975) states: "[No automobile liability insurance . . . covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state . .. .
(emphasis added).
28. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
29. Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1961, no writ); accord, Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 356 S.W.2d 613
(Ark. 1962). See generally Comment, Insurance-PyramidingMedical Payment Coverages in Automobile Policies, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737 (1974).
,30. 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, no writ).
31. The pertinent contractual provisions were as follows: The coverage portion of
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Based upon the policy provisions limiting liability, the insurer contended
that its liability could not exceed $500, while the plaintiff sought to stack
the coverages on the basis of the separability clause. In affirming the district
court's decision to allow stacking, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals initially
took cognizance of the consideration equities. Separate premiums had been
charged for each car, thus if separate policies had been written, the insured
could have recovered $500 per car and, if the insured had only paid one
premium, she still could have recovered $500. In other words, unless double
recovery was permitted, there would be no consideration for the payments
of the premium on the second car.32 Recognizing this lack of consideration
the court indicated that the insurer had suffered no increased risk by issuing
coverage on the second automobile. 3 3 The policy terms clearly provided coverage for the insured and each relative injured in an accident while occupying or through being struck by an automobile. .In other words, the terms
of the policy followed the insured rather than the automobiles listed in the
policy. The insured and her family were covered regardless of which vehicles had been charged with the premiums. Under uninsured motorist provisions, the premiums are charged "to" the automobile in the sense that other
automobiles are excluded, that is, other vehicles belonging to the insured
upon which no premium has been paid. No such limitation applied in
Atkins.
Due to conflicting contractual provisions, the court employed generally ac34
In
cepted rules of construction to afford the plaintiff a double recovery.
such a case, the limit of liability clause was offset by the separability clause,
thus allowing a $500 recovery for each car.85 Whereas the limit of liability
clause stated that $500 was the total recovery allowed any one person in any
one accident, the separability clause provided that the policy terms applied
separately to each car. The two provisions were in obvious conflict and,
therefore, the policy was construed in favor of the insured to permit double
the policy contained the heading "Medical Payments" under which liability was limited
to $500.

The premiums charged for this coverage were listed separately as $8.00 for

car number one and $7.00 for car number two. The medical payment clause stated that
the insurer would pay all medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident to the
named insured and each relative while occupying or in being struck by an automobile.
The total liability was stated to be the liability in the policy declarations for one person and any one accident.

Finally, there was a provision which stated when two or

more automobiles were insured, the terms of the policy applied to each separately. Id.
at 893-94.
32. Id. at 894.
33. It may be argued that a family with two or more cars will have increased total
exposure time to accident risks over a family with one car; however, courts are not
prone to review the statistical aspect of insurance rates. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 687 (Tex. 1974).
34. Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Houston 1961, no writ).
35. Id. at 894.
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recovery.3 6 This conclusion is sound in that it provides for a reasonable construction of the policy. It is also logical to allow double recovery where
double premiums are paid at no increased risk to the insurer. It should be
noted, however, that the policy terms provided coverage regardless of
whether the vehicle involved, if any, was insured or not.
Atkins has been cited frequently by courts with approval. 37 Of special
interest are portions of another court's opinion allowing stacking of medical
payments protection in Dhane v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. 3 8 It should
be noted that in Dhane the policy provisions were slightly different from
those in Atkins. The medical payments clause in Dhane provided coverage
for medical expenses as the result of an accident to: (1) the named insured
and each relative injured while occupying an insured automobile, a nonowned automobile, or through being struck by an automobile, and (2) to
guests injured while occupying an insured automobile.3 9
The court of civil appeals initially followed the general rules of construction, stating that an ambiguity present in a policy should be construed in
favor of the insured. 40 The ambiguity involved the above stated medical
payments clause and the separability clause. In combining the terms of both
clauses the court construed the policy, to cover medical expenses incurred by
the named insured and each relative: (a) while occupying an automobile
for which a specific premium indicated that coverage was afforded; (b) while
occupying a non-owned automobile; or (c) through being struck by an automobile. 41 Upon examination of this clause as rewritten by the court, it is
clear that subdivision (a) provided coverage for each separate vehicle, while
subdivision (b) provided coverage in accidents where any uninsured vehicles
were involved. Thus subdivision (a) would dictate that stacking not be allowed while subdivision (b) indicates otherwise.4 2
Interpreting subdivision (c), the court observed that the clause would apply where the insured was a pedestrian, or was riding in any automobile,
whether insured or not. This reasoning would also seem to require stacking
of benefits. Consequently, the policy was capable of several constructions,
and, because the plaintiff had been struck by an automobile, she was entitled
43
to a stacking of benefits under the three-car policy.
36. Id. at 895.
37. Greer v. Associated Indemn. Corp., 371 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1967); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 686 (Tex. 1974); Harlow v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no
writ).
38. 497 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), affd sub nom. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
39. Id. at 325.
40. Id. at 327.
41. Id. at 328.
42. Id. at 328.
43. Id. at 328. In Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol7/iss4/9

8

York: Stacking Uninsured Motorist Protection, Medical Payments, and Per

1976]

COMMENTS

From the foregoing cases, 44 it is clear that ambiguous language in an insurance contract is an important factor in permitting an insured to stack coverages. Once it is determined that the various medical payments and related
provisions are ambiguous as to the amount of coverage provided, most courts
will employ the rules of construction which allow an insured multiple recovery. Only a few cases, such as Atkins, have explored the consideration argument which is so prominent in the uninsured motorist cases.
THE TEXAS PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION STATUTE

In 1973 the Texas Legislature adopted a version of "no-fault" insurance
in requiring that all automobile liability insurance policies include provisions
for personal injury protection unless specifically rejected by the insured. 45 In
essence, the statute requires that an automobile liability policy provide to the
insured, members of his household, and any authorized operator or passenger
including a guest occupant, up to $2,500 per person for payment of certain
expenses incurred as the result of an automobile accident. 4 6 The expenses
that are recoverable include necessary medical, surgical, hospital, and funeral
services. Loss of income where the injured person is an income producer
is also provided as well as necessary expenses for services ordinarily performed for care and maintenance of the family where the injured is not an
income producer. 4 7 The benefits required by the Act are payable irrespective of fault, and no right of subrogation accrues to an insurer in paying
48
such benefits.
PIP is similar in nature to some "no-fault" statutes in other states. 49 For

example, in Massachusetts, the pioneer of "no-fault" insurance legislation,

1974), the supreme court merely affirmed the holding of the court of civil appeals concerning the stacking of medical payments coverage, stating that it remained in general
agreement that the stated medical payments limits were to be stacked where necessary
to cover the expenses of the named insured or a relative. Id. at 686. From this general
approval of stacking medical payments, it is unclear how the supreme court would hold
in a situation where the terms of the medical payments clause are both clear and explicit, and worded as precisely as an uninsured motorist clause. The opinion does not
make the distinction as to whether the court approved stacking medical payments per
se, or whether it merely approved the general rules to be followed in construing insurance contracts.
44. In Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), the court allowed stacking for the same reasons given in Dhane; that is, conflicts
in the policy provisions are construed in favor of the insured. id. at 97. See Bracy
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1973) where stacking of
medical payments coverage was denied on the basis that the exclusion provisions in the
policy were clear and unambiguous. Id. at 175-76.
45. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(a) (Supp. 1975).
46. Id. art. 5.06-3(b).
47. Id. art. 5.06-3(b).
48. Id. art. 5.06-3(c).
49. For a general overview of the various legislation in other states, see Fire Cas.
& Sur. B. Nc-1 (1974).
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coverage paying up to $2,000 in benefits is required for the insured, members
of his household, authorized operators or passengers including guest occupants, and any pedestrians struck by the insured, regardless of fault in the
causation of the accident.5 0 The benefits cover reasonable expenses for necessary medical and hospital services, and payments for services that would
have been performed for the benefit of household members.5 1 Moreover,
the statute provides for recovery of lost wages for employed individuals, in52
cluding the self-employed, and loss of earning power for the unemployed.
The major distinction between the Texas and Massachusetts statutes is the
partial elimination of tort actions under the Massachusetts system. 53 In that
state a person injured in an automobile accident may bring an action to
recover damages for pain and suffering only if the reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred in treating the injury are greater than $500 unless the injury causes death, the loss of a body member, disfigurement, or results in
certain losses of sight or hearing.5 4 Under the Texas PIP the only restriction
to litigation is the denial of subrogation rights to an insurer paying PIP benefits. 55
Uninsured motorist protection, medical payments, and other considerations
provide a guide as to how policy provisions required by the personal injury
protection statute will be construed with regard to stacking of coverage in
a single multi-car policy. In the typical automobile policy, the wording of
PIP coverage is closely related to that used in uninsured motorist protection
provisions. For example, as noted, the separability clause in Westchester
Fire Insurance Co. v. Tucker5 6 did not affect the uninsured motorist provi-

sions. In the standard policy, PIP is also unaffected by the separability
57
clause.
The Texas Supreme Court in Westchester also held that the phrase "to pay
all sums" used in the uninsured motorist clause created no doubt in defining
the limit of an insurer's liability. 58 The same reasoning is equally applicable
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (1975).
For a brief summary of the
Massachusetts no-fault provisions, see 13 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §
48:179.2, at 157-59 (Supp. 1974).
51.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (1975).

52. Id. This last provision has a limitation in that any employee wage continuation benefits are deducted from a lost earnings amount and only 75 per cent of this
amount is recoverable through the statutory benefits. Id.
53. Compare id. § 34M (1975), with TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Supp.
1975).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (1974).
55. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(c) (Supp. 1975).
56. 512 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1974).
57. In the Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement the separability clause is in the

"conditions" section of the policy. The PIP Endorsement states that certain policy conditions are to apply to the PIP clauses; the separability clause is not included among
them. Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement, Form 241 (1973).

58. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1974).
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to PIP where the insurer agrees to "pay all reasonable and necessary...
expenses." 59 Just as the clause limiting liability tempers the "pay all sums"
provision under uninsured motorist coverage, the PIP provision restricts the
"pay all reasonable and necessary expenses" phrase.
In Westchester, it was likewise noted that the clause limiting liability made
it clear that stacking was improper. 60 The limitations of liability applicable
to PIP are less clear. In the standard policy it is stated that "the total aggregate limit of liability for all benefits . . . shall not exceed the limit of liability
set out in the schedule of this endorsement." 61 On the surface, the extent
of liability would seem to be the limit set out for each automobile. An argument can be made, however, that since the limit isn't specifically tied to the
liability limits for one person or accident, but rather to the schedule as a
whole, stacking will be allowed. Reference to the schedule, it may be argued, would allow aggregation of all the limits of liability for the designated
automobiles.
The PIP provisions also parallel the uninsured motorist provisions in Westchester as they relate to the argument that additional premiums charged by
62
PIP
the insurer for additional vehicles are supported by consideration.
coverage is provided to the insured, his relatives, and non-relatives while occupying or using an insured automobile.6 3 An insured automobile is defined
as one described in the schedule as an insured vehicle to which bodily injury
liability coverage applies. 64 Furthermore, the PIP exclusions section disallows recovery where injury is sustained while occupying or being struck by
an owned but uninsured automobile. 6 5 These provisions indicate that the
consideration for extra PIP premiums on additional vehicles is the coverage
afforded: (1) the insured and his relatives when occupying or being struck
by the additional vehicles, and (2) guests while occupying the additional vehicles. The result, therefore, is identical to that given the uninsured motorist
clauses. Additionally, premiums are charged for the further risk involved
in covering second and subsequent vehicles.
In contrast is the fact that medical payments clauses are afforded different
treatment than uninsured motorist or PIP clauses. Most significantly, the
separability clause applies to medical payments coverage while specifically
excluding uninsured motorist and PIP clauses. Furthermore, the separate
premiums paid for medical payments are construed to provide for multiple
coverage as a result of contractual ambiguities which make it difficult to de59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement, Form 241 (1973).
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1974).
Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement, Form 241 (1973).
Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. 1974).
Texas Standard Automobile Endorsement, Form 241 (1973).
Id.

65. Id.
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termine the consideration given by insurers for additional premiums charged.
No such ambiguities exist in uninsured motorist or PIP provisions. Although
a generic relationship exists between medical payments and PIP as to the
type of benefits paid, the similarity ends there. Thus, the construction given
by the courts to uninsured motorist provisions, coupled with the fact that PIP
clauses are almost identical in wording, infers that no stacking of PIP should
be allowed.
Other aspects of PIP such as the wording of the statute itself should be
considered. In section (b) of the PIP section of the Insurance Code, provisions are made for PIP coverage to include various types of medical expenses
and loss of income.06 At the end of this section, where it is indicated which
losses are recoverable, it is specifically provided that "[tihe personal injury
protection in this paragraph specified shall not exceed $2,500 for all benefits,
in the aggregate, for each person. ' 67 This wording gives rise to some questions as to the drafter's intent. One interpretation suggests that the maximum amount recoverable under PIP is $2,500. Another interpretation is
that the PIP coverage is $2,500 as to the various benefits provided, that is,
recovery of medical expenses, and of lost earnings or household services.
If the second interpretation is indeed the correct one, then the $2,500 limitation applies only to the various types of expenses for which reimbursement
will be made, but does not in any way affect the question of stacking arising
out of insurance policy interpretation conflicts. 68
Aside from the $2,500 limitation provision and the clause providing that
an insurer may increase the amount of benefits payable, there is no wording
indicative of legislative intent concerning stacking. Consequently, interpretation must eventually come from cases construing actual insurance policies.
There are two possible ramifications, however, arising from the fact that PIP
is a legislative product. One is that PIP even more closely relates to uninsured motorist coverage, for that is also a statutory creation. If there has
been any motivation on the part of courts regarding extension of coverage
limitations in uninsured motorist coverage cases, such motivation will also
apply to personal injury protection. The second consideration involves the
weight given to PIP's statutory origin when deciding issues of public policy
in cases involving interpretation and construction of insurance policies. In
66. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(b) (Supp. 1975).
67. Id. 5.03-1(b).
68. To illustrate these interpretations, assume the insured sustained $2,500 medical
expenses and $2,500 loss of earnings. The first interpretation would limit his recovery
to $2,500, that being the maximum amount allowed by the statute in any one accident.
The second interpretation would hold this restriction to mean that only a total of $2,500
could be recovered as between the medical expenses and loss of earnings; that is, the
insured could not add the two types of damages to gain a $5,000 recovery. This second
interpretation, however, would not affect stacking two PIP recoveries. The second interpretation leaves open the question of how many single recoveries can be had under
the insurance policy.
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Westchester and previous cases public policy has been used to negate the effect of certain aspects of an insurance contract. 69 Of course, there is no
doubt that this same recognition of public policy will have to be given to PIP
by the courts.
It has been mentioned that PIP is similar to medical payments in a generic
sense. This is true because both coverages provide recovery of medical expenses (PIP additionally provides for loss of earnings). Also, both coverages
provide benefits regardless of fault on the part of the insured. How significant the relationship is between the two types of protection remains to be
determined.
CONCLUSION

The question as to stacking of uninsured motorist protection and medical
payments clauses in Texas has been settled; however, the question remains
as to whether stacking of personal injury protection coverages will be permitted. A balancing test resolving the treatment to be given personal injury
protection would weigh heavily against stacking. The precedent, via uninsured motorist clauses, seems to indicate that stacking will be denied for PIP.
It is true that some possible conflicts in insurance clauses may allow rules
of construction to provide a means of securing more than one recovery. The
better approach, however, would be to deny stacking on the strength of precedent and better logic.
69. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. 1974).
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